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Abstract
We evaluate the desirability of having an elastic currency generated by
a lender of last resort that prints money and lends it to banks in distress.
When banks cannot borrow, the economy has a unique equilibrium that
is not Pareto optimal. The introduction of unlimited borrowing at a zero
nominal interest rate generates a steady state equilibrium that is Pareto
optimal. However, this policy is destabilizing in the sense that it also
introduces a continuum of non-optimal in‡ationary equilibria. We explore
two alternate policies aimed at eliminating such monetary instability while
preserving the steady-state bene…ts of an elastic currency. If the lender
of last resort imposes an upper bound on borrowing that is low enough,
no in‡ationary equilibria can arise. For some (but not all) economies, the
unique equilibrium under this policy is Pareto optimal. If the lender of last
resort instead charges a zero real interest rate, no in‡ationary equilibria
can arise. The unique equilibrium in this case is always Pareto optimal.
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Recent developments in a number of countries have renewed interest in the role of a lender of
last resort. According to Fischer [7, p. 86] , ‘‘there is considerable agreement on the need for a
domestic lender of last resort,’’ even though there is some disagreement about exactly what this
lender should do. However, several recent papers have identified the lender of last resort as a cause
of excess volatility in emerging economies’ financial markets and of the currency crises that have
plagued many of these economies in the 1990s.
1 In response to these crises, proposals have been
made in a number of countries to either establish a currency board or abolish the national currency
altogether and adopt some other country’s currency as legal tender (this second arrangement is
often called dollarization). While adopting such policies may be successful in eradicating excess
volatility stemming fromspeculation against a domesticcurrency, they clearly donot come without
cost. In particular, both of these arrangements severely limit the ability of the central bank to act
as a lender of last resort. In light of these proposals, it is important to understand the implications
(both benefits and costs) of having a lender of last resort that is able to freely print money and lend
to the banking system.
One of the important roles of a lender of last resort is the provision of an elastic currency, that
is, the adjusting of the money supply in response to transitory changes in liquidity demand. This
role was important enough to merit high billing in the act establishing the Federal Reserve System
in the United States, ‘‘An act to provide for the establishment of Federal Reserve Banks, to furnish
an elastic currency, ::: and for other purposes.’’ Beginning with Sargent and Wallace [17] , several
papers have examined the effects of having an elastic currency supply.
2 These papers focus on
stationary equilibria and show how an elastic currency promotes a more efficient allocation of
resources in these equilibria. In the present paper, we show that when nonstationary equilibria
are considered, the picture can change dramatically. We build on the model of Champ, Smith, and
Williamson[4], whereaggregateliquidity shockscreatearolefor anelasticcurrency. Inthat paper,
the money supply is made elastic through the issue of private banknotes. We show how having a
lender of last resort that prints money and lends freely at a zero nominal interest rate generates the
same result: it allows the economy to completely overcome the liquidity shocks and makes the
1 See, for example, Chang and V elasco [5] , Mishkin [13] , and Fischer [7] .
2 Among them are Champ, Smith, and Williamson [4] , Williamson [24] , and Freeman [8] .
1stationary equilibrium Pareto optimal. However, we also show that there is a continuum of non-
optimal inflationary equilibria under this regime. Hence, while having an unrestricted lender of




question: What measures could be implemented to eliminate the inefficient equilibria associated
with unlimited, zero-nominal-rate lending, while retaining the benefits of such lending? We show
that in some cases this may be achieved by placing a sufficiently low ceiling on the real amount
banks can borrow, and that it always can be achieved by instead fixing the real interest rate on
loans at zero.
The model is a pure exchange, two-period-lived overlapping generations economy, where some
agents are lenders and others are borrowers. There is a store-of-value role for money. Agents are
assignedtoeither of twolocationsatbirth, andineachperiodafractionoflendersisforcedtomove
to the other location. Limited communication prevents claims on specific agents from being traded
across locations and therefore only money has value in exchange after relocation. As in Townsend
[21] , Mitsui and Watanabe [14] , and Hornstein and Krusell [11] , this generates a transactions role
for currency and allows equilibria where money is dominated in rate of return by other assets. In
this set-up, stochastic relocations act like the portfolio preference shocks commonly employed in
the literature on bank runs,
4 and banks arise to insure consumers against such uncertainty. These
banks write deposit contracts, hold reserves, and provide intermediation between borrowers and
lenders.
In this framework, we obtain the following results. In the absence of a lender of last resort, the
economy has a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is stationary, with a constant price level and
with banks holding the same fraction of their portfolio in the form of reserves at all times. There
is a critical value of the relocation shock below which these precautionary reserves suffice to fully
cover the demand for liquidity while equalizing the return on deposits for all agents. However,
for realizations of the relocation shock above this critical value, banks face a ‘‘liquidity crisis.’’
In this case, high liquidity demand leads to the complete exhaustion of banks’ cash reserves and,
3 SeealsoSmithandWeber[20],whichusesarelatedenvironmenttoshowhowhavinganelasticcurrencygenerated
by unrestricted private banknote issue can lead to even more severe indeterminacies.
4 See, for example, Diamond and Dybvig [6] , Jacklin [12] , Wallace [23] , and Peck and Shell [16] .
2since other bank assets are illiquid, drives a wedge between the returns earned by depositors who
are subject to the relocation shock and those who are not. Since the aggregate resources of the
economy are non-stochastic, this allocation is clearly not Pareto efficient. Inflation is inconsistent
with equilibrium in this setting because stochastic relocation generates a strong demand for cash
reserves, evenwhenthe rateof returntoholding money islow. Whenthemoney supply isconstant,
a sustained inflation would cause the real stock of money to go to zero and would thereby lead to
an excess demand for money; in this way, inflation would preclude market clearing.
If instead the lender of last resort opens a discount window and lends freely at a zero nominal
interestrate, thesetofequilibriaissubstantially different. Inthiscasethesteady stateequilibriumis
Pareto optimal. Compared to the equilibrium for the benchmark case, banks hold a lower fraction
of their portfolio as real balances. They obtain a discount window loan whenever reserves are
insufficient to cover the demand for liquidity. By doing so they are able to fully insure agents
against the random liquidity shocks: relocated and non-relocated agents earn the same return in all
states of the world. However, inaddition to the Pareto optimal stationary equilibrium, the economy
also has a continuum of inflationary equilibria, none of which is Pareto optimal. With a lender
of last resort, the effective money supply (reserves plus short-term credit) is no longer fixed. The
entire point of having such a lender in this setting is to make the money supply elastic so that it
responds to the stochastic movements in money demand. If there is a sustained inflation, the real
value of the stock of reserves must go to zero, as before. In this case, however, the lender of last
resort promises to make good on any reserve shortages through discount window loans. Hence, the
availability of credit removes the strong demand for cash reserves and thereby allows inflation as
an equilibrium outcome.
Thisresultleadsustoexplorewhetheralternatediscountwindowpolicieswouldallowtheecon-
omy to preserve the desirable features of having lender-of-last-resort services without permitting
inflationary equilibria. A seemingly natural constraint would be to place an upper bound on the
amount of money that an individual bank can borrow. Ideally, this cap would be high enough that
it never binds in the steady state (preserving the Pareto optimality of this equilibrium), but low
enough that it eliminates all nonstationary equilibria. We show that whether or not this is possible
depends on the distribution of the aggregate liquidity shock. We then study an economy where dis-
count window loans have a zero real interest rate. In this case, inflationary equilibria are ruled out
3regardless of the distribution of the liquidity shock and the steady state is always Pareto optimal.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section lays out the basic elements of
the Champ, Smith, and Williamson [4] model. Section 3 describes equilibrium without a lender of
lastresort,whileSection4presentsthecaseofunrestrictedborrowingatazeronominalinterestrate.
Section 5 describes the behavior of an economy where banks face an upper bound on the amount
they can borrow, while Section 6 looks at a policy of fixing the real interest rate on liquidity loans.
Some concluding comments are offered in Section 7.
2. The Basic Model
In this section we describe those elements of the model that are independent of the type of lender-
of-last-resort services that are available to banks. The sections that follow then tailor the model to
the specific policy regimes we consider.
2.1 The Environment
We beginwiththepure-exchange monetary economy developedby Champ, Smith, andWilliamson
[4] . The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations,
plus an initial old generation. There is a single, perishable consumption good. At each date t =
0;1;::: , a continuum of agents with unit mass is born at each of two identical locations. Half of
these agents are ‘‘lenders’’ and the remaining half are ‘‘borrowers.’’ The former have endowments
(!1;!2) = (x;0), while the latter’s endowment vector is (!1;!2) = (0;y):
5 All consumers have
R2
++ as their consumption set and have preferences given by u(c1;c2) = ln(c1) + ¯ ln(c2): We
assume that ¯x > y holds, which implies that this is a ‘‘Samuelson case’’ economy (see Gale [9] )
and hence there is a role for money as a store of value. At t = 0 there is a continuum of old agents
with unit mass in each location. Each of these agents is endowed with M > 0 units of fiat money,
which we will refer to as ‘‘base money.’’ The stock of base money is constant over time.
In addition to the store of value role for money, spatial separation and limited communication
generateatransactionsroleformoney inaway reminiscentofTownsend[21],MitsuiandWatanabe
5 The fraction of the population in each group is not important; one-half is chosen arbitrarily. All that matters is the
total endowment of each group.
4[14], andHornsteinandKrusell [11] . Thisallowsmoney tobedominatedinrate of returnby other
assets. The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period, all agents receive their
endowments. At this point, agents cannot move between or communicate across locations. Goods
can never be transported between locations. Hence, goods and asset transactionsoccur autarkically
within each location. Y oung lenders can trade with old agents and can deposit resources in a bank.
The bank can also trade with old agents in order to achieve the desired allocation of cash in their
portfolio. Following this, young borrowers contact a bank and obtain a loan. (Note that borrow-
ers and lenders never directly meet – all transactions are intermediated.) At this point, all agents
consume. Next, a fraction ¼t of young lenders in each location is notified that they will be moved
to the other location. Limited communication prevents the cross-location exchange of privately
issued liabilities. Currency, on the other hand, is universally recognizable and non-counterfeitable,
and is therefore accepted in inter-location exchange. Movers are able to contact their bank and
withdraw currency. Immediately afterwards, the movers are relocated and the next period begins.
Agents now receive their old-age endowments, and borrowers use part of this endowment to repay
their loans. With this revenue, banks make repayments to lenders who did not move. Lenders who
did move use the currency they received from the bank to buy consumption in their new location
from either young lenders or banks. At this point all old agents consume and end their lifecycle.
Notice that the old-age consumption of a mover will always be equal to the real value of the money
that she takes with her to the new location.
6
The relocation probability ¼t is a random variable in each period that gives the size of the ag-
gregate liquidity shock; high values of ¼t correspond to high liquidity demand. It has support [0;1)
and is drawn from the twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing distribution function F
with associated density function f: It is independently and identically distributed over time.
2.2 Consumers
Borrowers, who never move, face a gross market interest rate of Rt. They choose their quantity of
borrowing `t to solve the problem
max
`t
ln(`t) + ¯ ln(y ¡ Rt`t):
6 Since the consumption set is R2
++, this implies that money must have positive value in equilibrium.





Lenders face a more complicated problem. Given that they are confronted with random reloca-
tion, they deposit all of their savings in a bank and receive a return that depends on both whether
or not they move and what fraction of all young lenders move.
7 Specifically, they are promised a
real return rt(¼) if they do not move and rm
t (¼) if they do move. Lenders then choose the amount
they save and deposit dt to maximize expected utility, that is, to solve
max
dt





t (¼)dt]f (¼)d¼ + ¯
Z 1
0
(1 ¡ ¼)ln[rt(¼)dt]f (¼)d¼:
The solution to this problem sets




The fact that saving is independent of the distribution of the rates of return clearly depends on the
assumptions of log utility and no old-age income for lenders, which imply that the income and
substitution effects of a change in the rate of return exactly offset each other.
2.3 Banks
Bankstakedeposits, makeloans, holdreserves, andannouncereturnschedules.
8 Any borrower can
establish a bank and banks behave competitively in the sense that they take the real return on assets
as given. On the deposit side, banks are assumed to behave as Nash competitors, which leads them
to choose deposit returns to maximize the expected utility of young lenders. The constraints that
banksfaceinthismaximizationproblemdependonwhatlender-of-last-resortservicesareavailable
to them.
Below we consider four different scenarios. First, as a benchmark case, we consider a world
without a lender of last resort. We then turn our attention to the economy with a lender of last resort
that provides unlimited discount window funds at a zero nominal interest rate. Next, we examine
7 An individual’s relocation status is assumed to be public information. Since in equilibrium no agent ever has an
incentive to misreport her status, this seems innocuous.
8 Banks make only one type of loan, and these loans are always repaid. Thus we are abstracting from the problems
of moral hazard and ‘‘excessively risky’’ behavior sometimes associated with the presence of a lender of last resort.
6the case where banks face an upper bound on the real amount they can borrow. Finally, we analyze
an economy with a lender of last resort that charges a zero real interest rate.
3. No Lender of Last Resort
In this section we discuss equilibrium for an economy in which banks are unable to borrow from
anyone other than lenders. We begin by describing the bank’s problem for this benchmark case,
which is very similar to the bank’s problem in the inelastic currency regime in Champ, Smith, and
Williamson[4]. Wethendiscussequilibriumconditionsandprove that equilibriumisuniqueunder
this policy.
3.1 The Bank’s Problem
Ayoung lender depositsher entiresavingsdwithabank. Per young depositor, thebankacquiresan
amount zt of real balances, and makesloanswitha real value d¡zt: The bankfacestwo constraints
withrespecttothereturnitpromisestomoversrm
t andthereturnitpromisestonon-moversrt. First,
relocated agents, of which there are ¼t, must be given currency, since that is the only asset which
will allow these agents to consume at time t + 1 in their new location. This is accomplished using
a fraction ®t(¼) of the bank’s holdings of cash reserves. Hence, letting pt denote the general price
level at time t,





t (¼) · ®t(¼)zt
pt
pt+1
must hold. If we denote by °t ´ zt








Second, real payments to non-movers, which occur at time t + 1, cannot exceed the value of the
bank’s remaining portfolio – remaining reserves plus loan repayments. Since loans earn the gross
9 That is, pt is the price of consumption in units of currency. Some authors (such as Wallace [22] and Balasko and
Shell [3] ) work instead with the inverse of pt; the price of money in units of consumption, because it better handles
situationswheremoney hasnovalue. Inourmodel, thephysicalenvironmentcombinedwiththeassumedconsumption
setsprecludesequilibriawithaninfinitepricelevel,andhencethetwowaysofdefiningthepricesystem areequivalent.
7real rate of return Rt, this constraint can be written as
(1 ¡ ¼)drt(¼) · (1 ¡ ®t(¼))zt
pt
pt+1
+ (d ¡ zt)Rt
or
(1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) · (1 ¡ ®t(¼))°t
pt
pt+1
+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt: (4)
Of course, 0 · °t · 1 and 0 · ®t (¼) · 1 must hold.
Because banks behave as Nash competitors and there is free entry, banks will maximize young
lenders’ utility, taking deposit demand d as given. Given (2), the bank’s problem is then to choose

























subject to the constraints (3) and (4), which will hold with equality at an optimum. Substituting in















0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1:
The function ®t, which is the fraction of bank reserves paid out to movers, is chosen after the
realization of ¼, while the function °t, the fraction of reserves in the bank’s asset portfolio, is
chosen before the realization of ¼: Hence we can first determine the optimal value of ®t for fixed
values of °t and ¼: That is, we can choose ®t to solve
max
0·®t·1





+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt
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pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t)Rt
: (7)
For realizationsoftherelocationshockbelowthecriticalvalue¼¤, thebankpaysoutonly afraction
of its reserves to movers, and both movers and non-movers receive the same return. When the
realization of the relocation shock is greater than ¼¤, the bank faces a ‘‘liquidity crisis.’’ It pays out
all its cash reserves to movers, while repayments to non-movers are drawn from loan repayments
only. In a crisis, the bank cannot equalize the returns of movers and non-movers; movers must
receive a lower return.
It remains to determine the optimal value of °t: To do so, we substitute the optimal value of ®t























+ (1 ¡ ¼)ln[(1 ¡ °t)Rt]
¶
f (¼)d¼:
This formulation of the problem makes it clear that the return earned by both movers and non-
movers will be the same when ¼ is less than ¼¤, but will in general be different when ¼ is greater


















(1 ¡ ¼)f (¼)d¼:
This can be reduced to
10




This implicitly defines the solution to the bank’s problem when no lender-of-last-resort services
are provided. The optimal °t results from the trade-off between two forces. First, the return on
cash balances is lower than the return on loans, and therefore the bank would like to economize on
reserve holdings. On the other hand, the bank strives to provide insurance by equalizing the returns
given to movers and non-movers. To be able to do so, it must hold sufficient cash balances. At
the margin, the welfare gains from equalizing the returns to movers and non-movers must exactly
10 The intermediate steps are provided in Appendix A.
9offset the cost implied by the return dominance of loans over cash reserves.
3.2 Equilibrium
Anequilibriumof thiseconomy ischaracterizedby the marketclearing conditionsfor real balances
and loans. Because the supply of real balances is equal to M
pt and the demand for real balances is







Similarly, the demand for loans is given in (1), while the supply of loans is given by (1 ¡ °t)d:
Together these yield the market clearing condition for loans,
y
(1 + ¯)Rt






















which we can substitute into (8) to obtain the difference equation






This implicitly defines the law of motion for °t: The properties of this law of motion give us the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 When there is no lender of last resort, the economy has a unique equilibrium. This






< °a < 1.
10The proof of this proposition is presented in Appendix B and is illustrated in Fig. 1. The law
Figure 1: No Lender of Last Resort
of motion implicitly defined in (11) crosses the forty-five degree line exactly once, and this steady
stateistheonly equilibriumoftheeconomy. Theabsenceofinflationary equilibriafollowsfromthe
strong demand for currency generated by logarithmic utility and the fact that relocated agents need
money to consume. In this model, there is a positive lower bound on the demand for real money
balances. As the rate of return to holding money goes to zero, real money demand approaches
E [¼]d (this follows from (8) using (7)). Hence an inflationary trajectory, along which °t would go
to zero, cannot be consistent with market clearing. Therefore, unlike the standard Samuelson-case
economy discussed in Gale [9] , this model cannot have inflationary equilibria when the money
supply is constant. The steady state is the unique equilibrium.
Notice, however, that this equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. There are states of the world in
whichtheconsumptionsofrelocatedandnon-relocatedlendersaredifferent,eventhoughthereisno
uncertainty about the aggregate resources of the economy. The problem is that banks must choose
11their reserve holdings before money demand is realized. If the bank could adjust these holdings
once demand is known by, say, borrowing from a lender of last resort when money demand is high,
it seems possible that a more efficient outcome could be achieved. We study various such lending
regimes in the remaining sections.
4. Lending at a Zero Nominal Interest Rate
In this section we analyze the regime in which the lender of last resort opens a discount window
and makes one-period loans of currency at a zero nominal interest rate in any quantity that banks
desire. Note that this policy is always feasible, in that it requires no real resources from the lender
of last resort. After the realization of ¼, a bank determines the real amount b ¸ 0 that it would like
to borrow at time t – which will depend on the realization of ¼ – and obtains bpt dollars from the
discount window. In the following period, the bank must return these dollars to the window and
they are destroyed. In this way, the stock of beginning-of-period base money remains fixed.
4.1 The Bank’s Problem
Defining ±t ´ bt
d to be real borrowing per unit of deposits, the bank’s constraints become
¼r
m








(1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) = (1 ¡ ®t(¼))°t
pt
pt+1








t (¼) + (1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) = °t
pt
pt+1
+ (1 ¡ °t)Rt: (14)




t (¼) = rt(¼) for all ¼;
that is, depositors receive perfect insurance against the relocation shock. One way the bank could



































where ¼¤ continues to be given by (7). For realizations of the relocation shock below the critical
value ¼¤, the bank pays out only a fraction of its reserves to movers and, under this plan, does not
obtain a discount window loan. When the relocation shock is larger than ¼¤, the bank does obtain
a loan from the discount window and pays out this loan plus reserves to movers. At the beginning
of next period, non-movers are paid what remains after the bank has repaid the discount window
loan. Note, however, that the bank could also borrow money when ¼ is below ¼¤; give this money
to movers, and use cash reserves to repay the loan next period. With a zero nominal interest rate,
an individual bank’s demand for loans fromthe discount windowisnot uniquely determined. What
is determined, however, is the real value of the money given to movers. This is always chosen to
equate the returns to movers and non-movers.
Since movers and non-movers receive the same return, both must receive the average return
on the bank’s portfolio, which is the right-hand-side of (14). In order to maximize this return, the

























The market-clearing equations are the same as in the previous section, and hence (9) and (10)
continue to hold. In equilibrium we cannot have °t = 0, because this would imply that the price
level is infinite, which in turn would imply that movers would have zero old-age consumption.
We cannot have °t = 1 either, since then borrowers would have zero young-period consumption.





must obtain. After substituting (16) into (9) and (10), the market clearing conditions simplify to







The properties of this law of motion give us the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the lender of last resort offers unrestricted loans with a zero nominal interest
rate,theeconomy hasacontinuumofequilibria. ThereisaParetooptimalstationary equilibriumfor
°0 = 1¡
y
¯x = °b, and acontinuumof non-optimal, inflationary equilibriumpaths for °0 2 (0;°b).
The proof of Proposition 2 is straightforward and therefore omitted. The results of this proposition
are illustratedinFig. 2. Thestriking featureof thenewlawof motionisthatit permitsinflationary
Figure 2: A Zero Nominal Interest Rate
equilibria, where °t asymptotically approaches zero. It is clear from (16) that the equilibrium
14nominal interest rate is always zero here, and that therefore the lender of last resort is charging
exactly the market rate on loans. Because of this, there is no ‘‘penalty’’ if a bank’s reserve holdings
turn out to be too low. The bank can simply borrow cash at the same interest rate that it is earning
on its real lending. This is what generates the indeterminacy of the bank’s portfolio decision (15),
and it implies that there is no lower bound on the demand for reserves. As a result, a sustained
inflation, where aggregate reserve holdings must go to zero, is consistent with equilibrium in this
case. As reserve holdings decrease, borrowing from the discount window increases. In this way,
the lender of last resort responds to inflation by increasing short-term credit, which in turn makes
inflation consistent with equilibrium.
In the steady state, the provision of zero nominal interest rate loans allows the economy to
completely overcome the stochastic relocation friction. Since banks can now borrow money when
the demand for it is high, they no longer hold precautionary reserves and therefore the steady state
reserve-deposit ratio is smaller than in the case without a lender of last resort. In fact, the law of
motion (17) is identical to the one that would obtain if there were no relocations in this economy. It
is well known that the steady state is Pareto optimal in this case, but that the inflationary equilibria
are not.
11
In summary, the introduction of this type of lending generates a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
However, it also generates a continuum of inflationary equilibria that are not Pareto efficient. Is it
bettertohavealenderoflastresortornot? Therearenoclearcriteriaforansweringsuchaquestion,
since it involves comparing the sets of equilibria generated by two different policies. Rather than
address it directly, we take the approach used in Shell [18] , Grandmont [10] , Woodford [25] , and
Smith [19] (among others). We ask if it is possible to design a policy that captures the benefits of
providing lender-of-last-resort services without introducing inflationary equilibria. We study two
policies, the first of which restricts the amount of borrowing that can be undertaken and the second
of which involves fixing the real interest rate on discount window loans.
5. An Upper Bound on Borrowing
The analysis above shows that the ability to borrow at a discount window undermines the incentive
11 This follows from Proposition 5.6 in Balasko and Shell[2] . See also p.838 in Champ, Smith and Williamson[4] .
15for banks to hold reserves and that this is the source of the resulting inflationary equilibria. In this
section we suppose that the lender of last resort places an upper bound on the real amount that a
bank can borrow.
12 We show that if this bound is low enough, it will restore the bank’s demand for
cash reserves and thereby eliminate the inflationary equilibria. We ask if the bound can at the same
time be high enough to never bind in the steady state. We show that whether or not this is the case
depends on the distribution of the liquidity shocks.
5.1 The Bank’s Problem
We use c 2 (0;1) to denote the real amount that a bank can borrow per unit of depositsthat it holds.
The bank continues to face the constraints (12) and (13). Substituting these constraints into the
bank’sobjective function (5), dropping the constant terms, and taking intoaccount the upper bound



















0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
0 · ±t · c:
As before, we can first determine the optimal values of ®t and ±t for given values of °t and ¼.
Clearly, the borrowing constraint can only be binding in some states if its value is smaller than the
value of the loan a bank would take for ¼ = 1 in the absence of the constraint. Hence, the problem
of choosing ®t and ±t here differs from the one in Section4 only if reserve holdings are low enough
that
°t < 1 ¡
pt
pt+1Rt
c ´ e °
12 An upper bound on the amount of nominal borrowing would always be effective in eliminating inflationary equi-
libria, but theremay be credibility issueswithsuchabound. Constraintsonthe real amountofborrowing may be easier
to commit to; as an example one might think of a dollarized economy where the central bank has accumulated a stock
of dollars and can lend from this stock but cannot print more.
16holds. We begin with this case. For low values of ¼, the bank’s optimal amount of borrowing is
not uniquely determined, as in the previous section. However, the solution to the problem again
involves equating the returns of movers and non-movers whenever this is possible. One way of


























































pt+1 + (1 ¡ °t)Rt
: (18)
Note that this expression for ¼¤¤ is less than unity if and only if °t < e ° holds. If °t ¸ e ° holds, the
bank can equalize returns for movers and non-movers for all values of ¼, as in the previous section.
We can now determine the bank’s optimal portfolio in the presence of borrowing constraint.



























¼ln[°t + c] + (1 ¡ ¼)ln
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¼ln[°t + c] + (1 ¡ ¼)ln
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Here we see that the returns earned by moversand non-movers will be the same when ¼ is less than





















which can be reduced to
13
°t = 1 ¡





This equation implicitly defines the optimal portfolio allocation when its solution satisfies °t < e °:
Otherwise, the optimal allocation resembles that in the previous section: the bank is indifferent




The market-clearing conditions (9) and (10) continue to hold. Substituting these equations into the










Substituting this into (19), we obtain


























As shown in Fig. 3, the phase plane is divided into two regions. Below the lower dashed line,
the law of motion is given by (20). Above this line, it is given by (17). Both curves intersect the
dashed line at °t = 1 ¡ c > 0, and therefore the piecewise-defined law of motion is continuous.
Whether or not the bound affects the steady state equilibrium simply depends on whether or not
°t < e ° holds when °t+1 = °t: That is, c is binding in some states in the stationary equilibrium if
13 The intermediate steps are provided in Appendix C.
18Figure 3: An Upper Bound on Borrowing





Whether or not there exist inflationary equilibria is determined by (20), since this governs the
law of motion near the origin. The demand for reserves is given by (19). Taking the limit as the





°t = E [¼] ¡ c(1 ¡ E [¼]);




1 ¡ E [¼]
holds, then the demand for reserves has a positive lower bound. This case is qualitatively similar
to having no lender of last resort (c = 0): Demand for reserves never goes to zero, and therefore
19sustained inflations are not possible in equilibrium. This is the case depicted in Fig. 3, where the
law of motion intersects the horizontal axis to the right of the origin.
If instead we have
c >
E [¼]
1 ¡ E [¼]
;
thenthedemandfor reservesgoestozerowhenthereturntoholding money approachessome finite
number. In this case the part of the law of motion given by (20) also begins at the origin, and hence
the set of equilibria is qualitatively similar that when there is an unrestricted lender of last resort
(c = 1): There is a continuum of inflationary equilibria, none of which are Pareto optimal. Finally,
if we happen to have
c =
E [¼]
1 ¡ E [¼]
;
the demand for reserves goes to zero only as the rate of return to holding money goes to zero. In
this case there are true hyperinflationary equilibria where the inflation rate grows without bound.
The following proposition formalizes this result.






is a stationary equilibrium with °t = °b for all t. If c <
E[¼]
1¡E[¼] holds, this is the unique equilibrium.
If instead c ¸
E[¼]
1¡E[¼] holds, there is also a continuum of inflationary paths for °0 2 (0;°b):
Theproof of thisproposition closely followsthe reasoning givenabove andisthereforeomitted.
Itisinterestingtonotethattheconditionforctoaffectthesteady stateequilibriumandthecondition





then an upper bound of this sort is an ideal policy. The cap can be chosen high enough to never
bindinthesteady state(makingthisequilibriumefficient), whilestillbeinglowenoughtoeliminate
inflationary equilibria. Note that this condition necessarily holds if the expected value of ¼ is at
least 1
2; as it is for the uniform distribution. If, however, high liquidity demand is a rare event (and
hence E [¼] is low), the bound required to eliminate the inflationary equilibria would be low and
the stationary equilibrium would exhibit periodic crises.
206. Lending at a Zero Real Interest Rate
We now return to a situation where the discount window offers one-period loans of currency in any
quantity that banks desire. However, the interest rate on these loans is now fixed in real terms (at
zero) as long as the inflation rate is nonnegative. Specifically, after the realization of ¼, a bank
determines the real amount b ¸ 0 that it would like to borrow at time t (which will depend on
the realization of ¼) and obtains bpt dollars from the discount window. Next period, the bank
must return bpt+1 dollars as long as pt+1 ¸ pt holds, and bpt dollars otherwise. The reason for
this two-part rule is that under a deflation, the ability to borrow at a zero real interest rate would
generate an arbitrage opportunity for banks (at the expense of the lender of last resort). For the
announced policy to be feasible under all possible inflation rates, the nominal interest rate can
never be negative. Another way of stating the policy that we study here is that it sets the nominal







In the event of an inflation, the lender of last resort earns positive profits on discount window
loans under this policy. We assume that the lender of last resort then engages in purchases of goods
so that the stock of beginning-of-period base money remains unchanged at M: We further assume
that agents derive no utility from these purchases. If instead the revenue were rebated to banks as
a state-contingent, lump-sum payment, the qualitative properties of the results would not change.
Because such rebates complicate the algebra substantially, we present the simpler case here.
6.1 The Bank’s Problem
Again letting ±t = bt












(1 ¡ ¼)rt(¼) = (1 ¡ ®t (¼))°t
pt
pt+1







Substituting these into the bank’s objective function (5) and dropping the constant terms yields the
14 Under this policy and many others, deflation is not an equilibrium outcome. Because of this, the exact form that
the policy takes in the case ofa deflation is not important. We have chosen this one simply because much ofthe needed
























0 · °t · 1
0 · ®t(¼) · 1
±t(¼) ¸ 0:
We break the solution of the bank’s problem into two cases. First, suppose that the price level is
either constant or falling between two periods (pt+1 · pt). In this case, borrowing under the stated
policy isthesameasborrowingatazeronominalinterestrate,andthesolutiontothebank’sproblem
is the same as in section 4. Therefore the solution is characterized by (15) and rm
t (¼) = rt (¼):
If instead there is inflation (pt+1 > pt), the bank’s problem is more complex. As in the previous
sections, we can first solve for the optimal values of ®t and ±t given °t and ¼: That is, we can
choose ®t and ±t to solve
max
®t;±t














0 · ®t · 1
±t ¸ 0:




















































°t + (1 ¡ °t)Rt
< 1: (23)
As in the previous sections, when the realization of ¼ is low, the bank equates the returns received
by movers and non-movers by giving only a fraction of its reserves to movers. When a relocation
shock between ¼¤ and ¼¤¤ materializes, all reserves are paid out to movers, but the bank does not
resort to a discount window loan. Only when the relocation shock is larger than ¼¤¤ does the bank
obtain a loan. The range of inaction [¼¤;¼¤¤] is generated by a kink in the bank’s opportunity set.
Once the level of reserves is set, the bank has a certain amount of currency on hand and the return
to holding that currency is
pt
pt+1: The cost of acquiring additional currency, however, is unity. The
increase in lenders’ expected utility must be sufficiently large before the bank will undertake any
borrowing at this rate.
Given this optimal schedule for ®t and ±t, the bank chooses °t to solve (22). The first-order










°t + (1 ¡ °t)Rt












(1 ¡ ¼)f (¼)d¼;







which implicitly defines the solution to the bank’s problem when there is inflation.
6.2 Equilibrium
The market-clearing equations are the same as in the benchmark case, and hence (9) and (10)
continue to hold. We divide the phase plane into two regions and derive the equilibrium law of
motion in each region. We begin with the region where °t+1 ¸ °t holds. In this case (9) implies
that pt+1 = pt holds andtherefore we must have Rt = 1for all t. This implies°t = 1¡
y
¯x = °b for
all t, and therefore we have the same steady-state law of motion asin section 4. Notice in particular
15 The intermediate steps are provided in Appendix D.
23that this implies that we have the same steady-state equilibrium as in Section 4.
Next we examine the region where °t+1 < °t. From (9) it is clear that equilibria in this region
wouldexhibitinflation. Substituting(9)and(10)intotheexpressionfor¼¤ in(7)andtheexpression





























We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the lender of last resort charges a zero real interest rate on discount window
loans, the economy has a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is stationary, with °t = °b for all t,
and is Pareto optimal.
The proof of Proposition 4 is presented in Appendix E and is illustrated in Fig. 4. Fixing the
real interest rate rather the nominal rate is effective in eliminating inflationary equilibria because,
during an inflation, the lender of last resort is charging a higher rate than the market rate on loans.
Along an inflationary path, the interest rate on real loans to borrowers is falling to
y
¯x < 1; but the
cost of borrowing from the discount window is fixed at unity. Hence this policy is in line with the
recommendation of Bagehot [1] that ‘‘in a crisis, the lender of last resort should lend freely, at a
penalty rate.’’ Underthispolicy, thelenderoflastresortischargingapenalty rateifandonly ifthere
is inflation. This generates a lower bound on the demand for reserves. To see why, suppose that
the economy follows an inflationary trajectory. As the real stock of base money decreases, banks
engage in more real lending and the rate of return to real lending falls. Imagine a situation where °
has become very close to zero, that is, where there has been sustained inflation for many periods.
This implies that in practically every period, the bank will be borrowing currency at a cost of unity.
At the same time, the return the bank is receiving from its real lending is close to
y
¯x < 1. Hence,
regardless of the rate of return on money, the bank would be better off holding more reserves and
engaging in less lending simply because borrowing is so expensive. This means there is a lower
bound on the demand for reserves, even as the rate of return to holding money goes to zero. For
24Figure 4: A Zero Real Interest Rate
this reason there cannot be a sustained inflation.
It is interesting to note that fixing the nominal interest rate at some level above zero cannot
eliminate inflationary equilibria. In this situation, the inflation rate can always adjust so that the
lender of last resort ischarging exactly the market rate onreal loans. Thisremovesthe lower bound
on the demand for base money and permits inflation as an equilibrium outcome. Fixing the real
interest rate works because it guarantees that the lender of last resort is charging a penalty rate for
any positive rate of inflation.
7. Conclusions
We have studied a pure-exchange economy in which spatial separation, limited communication
and random relocation combine to create a role for money, even when it is dominated in rate of
return. Banks arise in this world to insure agents against the liquidity shocks implied by random
relocation. When the money supply is constant, the economy has a unique equilibrium that is not
25Pareto optimal. This equilibrium is marked by periodic crises in which high aggregate liquidity
demand leads to low consumption levels for agents in need of liquidity.
When we introduce a lender of last resort providing unlimited, zero-nominal-interest-rate loans
to banks in distress, the stationary equilibrium is Pareto optimal. However, there is a continuum of
inflationary equilibria that are not Pareto efficient. Thus, while allowing the economy to overcome
the frictions associated with stochastic relocation, the introduction of such lending also makes the
economy vulnerable to currency instability. We then show that these inflationary equilibria dis-
appear when the lender of last resort either (i) imposes a borrowing constraint on banks that is
sufficiently low or (ii) fixes the real interest rate on liquidity loans.
Thereareseveraldirectionsinwhichthepresentanalysiscouldbeextendedtoaddressadditional
issuesthatfigureprominently indiscussionsofthedesirability andoptimaldesignoflender-of-last-
resort services. First, our model is set up so that the provision of loans to banks does not affect the
government’s intertemporal budget constraint. Y et the fiscal cost of bank bailouts is a primary
concern in the design of lender-of-last-resort arrangements. Changes in the structure of the model
could be made to address this issue. Second, it is often argued that the explicit or implicit access
to loans provides banks with an incentive to take on ‘‘excessive’’ risk in its asset portfolio. This
could be addressed by adding technologies to the model that give banks a choice regarding the
riskiness of their investments. Third, in many emerging economies, and certainly in those that
are contemplating dollarization, a large fraction of banks’ liabilities and assets is denominated in
foreign currency. Hence, the provision of lender-of-last-resort services, because of its effect on the
money supply and thus on the exchange rate, may affect the real value of that part of the portfolio
that is denominated in foreign exchange. Addressing this issue would require either a two-country
oranopen-economy versionofthemodel. Weleavealloftheseimportantissuesforfutureresearch.
26APPENDIX A: DERIV ATION OF (8)
























































































¤) + °t ¡ °tF (¼
¤):






¼f (¼)d¼ = °tF (¼
¤) + °t ¡ °tF (¼
¤) = °t (26)
This can be written in another form by noting that
d
dx
[xF (x)] = F (x) + xf (x) (27)


































Substituting this into (26) yields the solution presented in (8).
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We cannot solve (11) explicitly for °t+1 as a function of °t, but we can derive some properties of
the implicit function. First note that when °t+1 = 0, which is its minimum value, °t is given by
°t = 1 ¡
R 1
0 F (¼)d¼ =
R 1
0 ¼f (¼)d¼ = E (¼): Thus the implicit function is not defined for
values of °t below the expected value of ¼: Next, when °t+1 = 1, which is its maximum value, °t
is strictly below one. Since the implicit function is continuous, there exists at least one steady state
for °: Moreover, at a steady state (11) implies that we have






We know F < 1 always holds, so any steady state ° must satisfy











Hence for any steady state






















Thus °t as a function of °t+1 is always increasing and hence is invertible. The inverse function is
the law of motion for °t, and it is also strictly increasing. By the inverse function rule we obtain


















Suppose we evaluate this slope at any steady state. Given (28) and taking into account that the
economy is a Samuelson case economy, which implies that y < ¯x, the first term of the slope is
greater than one for any steady state. The second term is always greater than or equal to one, so
for any steady state the derivative itself must be greater than one. The law of motion for °t must
therefore cross the 45± line from below at every steady state. This implies that there is exactly one
steady state, whichwewill denoteby °a andthat thissteady stateisin the open interval (E (¼);1):
The steady state is unstable, and all nonstationary trajectories eventually leave the feasible region.
Hence the steady state is the only equilibrium of this economy.
APPENDIX C: DERIV ATION OF (19)




















(1 ¡ ¼)f(¼)d¼: (29)





































(1 ¡ ¼)f(¼)d¼: (30)




































































Multiplying (33) (1 ¡ °t) and rearranging terms yields
1 ¡ °t =
·





This clearly reduces to (19).
30APPENDIX D: DERIV ATION OF (24)





















































































































¤) + [(1 ¡ °t)Rt + °t]¼
¤¤[1 ¡ F (¼
¤¤)] + °t[F (¼
¤¤) ¡ F (¼
¤)]:










¤) + °t[1 ¡ F (¼
¤¤)] + °tF (¼
¤¤) ¡ °tF (¼
¤)















































holds. Substituting this into (34) yields the solution presented in (24).
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
We divide the phase plane into two regions and analyze the equilibrium law of motion in each
region. When °t+1 ¸ °t, we know that the law of motion is the same as in Section 4, and therefore
no equilibrium has °t+1 > °t for some t. The only place the law of motion lies on the °t+1 = °t
ray (and hence the only steady-state equilibrium) is °t = 1 ¡
y
¯x = °b for all t. This is exactly the
same allocation as the steady state in section 4, and is therefore Pareto optimal.
What remains is to show that there are no equilibria where °t+1 < °t for some t. The law of






























The implicit function is defined and continuous in a neighborhood of any point where the denomi-
nator of this expression is nonzero, that is, where °t+1 is nonzero. Hence the law of motion is only














































































and the numerator of the slope is positive. This demonstrates that wherever the law of motion is
defined, it is strictly increasing.









Therefore the law of motion is (left) continuous at °t = 1 ¡
y
¯x: The slope of the law of motion is
greater than unity at this point, and therefore is not defined for °t > 1¡
y
¯x: It cannot intersect the
45-degree line anywhere else, because continuity would then imply that there are multiple steady-
state equilibria, contradicting the results above. Therefore the law of motion is a strictly increasing

















F (¼)d¼ ´ g(°) (35)
(this is the value of °t that would imply °t+1 = 0). We now proceed to show that ° > 0 holds. The
























































This shows that the function g is strictly increasing and strictly concave. It begins at the origin,
with slope equal to
¯x
y > 1 at this point. There is therefore a unique positive solution to (35); let °


















so that ° < 1 ¡
y
¯x holds.






for some ° > 0; and is not defined for °t < °. This curve is depicted in Fig. 4. The analysis
implies that any trajectory with °t+1 < °t for some t will leave the feasible region in finite time,
and therefore cannot be an equilibrium. Therefore °t = °b for all t is the unique equilibrium.
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